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BAR BRIEFS
TAXATION-DUE PROCESS-POWER OF STATES TO TAX INTANGIBLES. Testamentary trustee, residing in Rhode Island, was assessed $50 as a personal
property tax upon one half of the value of the corpus of the trust located
in New York. This suit is to recover the tax paid under protest. The
trustee's contention is that the Rhode Island statute, under which the
assessment was made, violates the due process clause by exhorting payment
measured by the value of property when that property is not given protection or benefit by the state. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed a
holding that the tax was valid. On appeal to the United States Supreme
Court it was held, that the judgment be affirmed. The state, having power
to tax its residents on the value of their out-of-state intangibles, can tax
a resident trustee on intangibles with a situs ojitside the state upon the
theory that the state provides equal benefits and protection under an organized government to its residents regardless of the nature of their
interest in the property taxed. Greenough v. Tax Assessors of City of Newport, 67 S. Ct. 1400, 71 R. I. 477, 47 A. 2d 625 (1947).
The land mark in the development of the taxation of intangibles from
1903 to the 30's was Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277, 47 L.
Ed. 439 (1903). Here, Justice Holmes decided that double taxation of intangibles did not contravene the fourteenth amendment, the privilege and
immunities clause, nor was there a denial of full faith and credit. The case
of Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59, 74 L.
Ed. 180 (1929), was a stepping stone in developing the basis of the taxation
of intangibles, in holding that intangibles in the hands of the owner of the
legal title (trustee), with a definite taxable situs in Maryland, could not
be taxed in Virgina, the residence of the equitable owner. The majority of
the court inferred that double taxation was unjust and refused to apply
"... the fiction of moblia sequuntur personam... in order to determine the
situs of intangible personal property for taxation." Justice Stone concurred in the result, but pointed out that double taxation is not the controlling factor, since there are different legal interests to be protected and
taxed by the two jurisdictions in such a situation. In the early 30's the
Supreme Court reversed thirty years of decisions, among them Cream of
Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325, 40 S. Ct. 558, 64 L. Ed. 931 (1920)
(upholding N. D. taxation of out-cf-state intangibles), by adopting the
restrictive doctrine of the undesirability of multiple taxation. Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436, 72 Am. L. Rep. 1303 (1930); First
National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313, 77 Am.
L. Rep. 1401 (1932). The Blackstone Case was explicitly overruled by
FarmersLoan Co. v. Minn., 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371, 65 Am.
L. Rep. 1000 (1930). The undersirability of multiple taxation was once
more denied in 1936 when Mr. Chief Justice Hughes sustained the double
taxation of intangibles. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 S.
Ct. 773, 80 L. Ed. 1143 (1936) ; Curry v. McCandless, 307 U. S. 357, 59 S.
Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339, 123 Am. L. Rep. 162 (1939). However, Justice Stone
restated the reasoning of the concurring opinion in the Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. Case and made those principles in law in this case. He again
pointed out the distinction between double taxation and taxation according
to the benefits and protection given by the state: reiterating that separate
interests are involved when a resident testatrix is taxed on an intangible
interest held by a trustee in another state, the theory being that when the
taxpayer conducts his activities so as to avail himself of the protection and
benefit of the laws of another state, that state has the right to tax these
interests. The principle case extended the 'benefits and protection theory
to a point where the domicile of a trustee is an adequate basis for the taxation of intangible interests, the documentary evidence of which is wholly
outside the territorial limits of the taxing state. Cf. Pearson v. McGraw,
308 U. S. 313, 60 S. Ct. 211, 84 L. Ed. 293, discussed in Comment, 13 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 453, 459 (1940), ". . . the court has left the inference that if
the benefits and protection theory will be the new criterion, it will make little
difference whether the property is tangible or intangible."
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